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4. Requirements

4.1 External Interfaces

⏩ IDM.AA.00006 Trust Services API

The Trust Services API is an API which evaluates policies in the background. In this scenario the API is used to check the proof state of the given presentationID to find out if the proof is valid or not. The API is returning a REST Codes and JSON structure with the associated proof information. ⏪

⏩ IDM.AA.00007 OIDC Interface

The OIDC Interface provides a standard OIDC flow which follows the open id connect protocol 1.0. ⏪

⏩ IDM.AA.00008 Token Interface

The token interface is a token endpoint of a standard IAM system and provides functionalities to obtain token with different token flows. This token endpoint MUST follow the OAuth2 authorization framework spec RFC6749. ⏪

4.1.1 User Interfaces

The SSI OIDC Broker interface provides a web page for login with a QR Code. (see more in the functional chapter below)

4.1.2 Software Interfaces

The product described within this specification does not expose any specific software interfaces other than communication interfaces covered in Communications Interfaces.

The choice of operating system, database system, tools and libraries are left open to the provider, as long as other requirements within this specification, especially those described in Product Constraints and Operating Environment are fulfilled.

4.1.3 Communications Interfaces SSI OIDC Broker Offered Interfaces

⏩ IDM.AA.00009 OIDC Provider

SSI OIDC Broker offers OpenID Connect provider interface for integration of authentication and authorization flows with any compatible application or identity brokering IAM system.

All offered HTTP interfaces are following OIDC.Core and OIDC.Discovery 1 as appropriate and specified in the feature description part of this specification. ⏪ Consumed Interfaces

⏩ IDM.AA.00010 Trust Services API

SSI OIDC Broker consumes policy evaluation interfaces of Trust Services API IDM.TSA 2 for back channel DIDComm-based authentication and authorization. ⏪ SSI IAT Provider Offered Interfaces

⏩ IDM.AA.00011 SSI Client Registration Auth API

SSI IAT Provider offers a HTTP-based REST API which allows for obtaining RFC7591 3 compliant Initial Access Token (IAT) for client registration at an OAuth2 Authorization Server. ⏪ Consumed Interfaces

⏩ IDM.AA.00013 OAuth2 token interface

SSI OIDC Broker connects to a standard IAM OAuth2 endpoint, using client credentials grant with appropriate scope, to generate new RFC7591 Initial Access Tokens. ⏪

4.2 Functional

4.2.1 Common

⏩ IDM.AA.00014 Credential Based Access Control (CrBac)

The SSI adoption shell SHOULD be able to dynamically reload credentials for access decisions, for instance the current identity wants a “sales” action and is currently just logged in with a “visitor” permission. The CrBac SHOULD be able to resolve this by requesting new credentials. This might be achieved either by a renewed authentication and authorization flow triggered by the application (via SSI OIDC Provider), or via an asynchronous process, which SHOULD be done over standard IAM outgoing PIP interface towards Trust Services or the It MAY be realized over additional components within the architecture, but the Standard IAM MUST NOT be modified (excepting configuration, plugins or supported extensions).

Acceptance Criteria

  1. During a resource access, it must be demonstrated that new credentials can be transmitted to get access

  2. The documentation must describe what to configure in the demonstration IAM ⏪

⏩ IDM.AA.00015 External PIP Integration

It MUST be demonstrated how an external PIP with asynchronous behavior can be integrated in the authorization services of a standard IAM system. It MAY be demonstrated with additional components. ⏪

4.2.2 SSI OIDC Broker

⏩ IDM.AA.00016 Standard open source IAM Package

Together with the Adoption Shell, the product MUST include a working integration with one basic open source IAM system. The selection has to be compliant with the Gaia-X policy and rules and any choice that supports the OAuth2 RFC7591 standard functions as Client Registration RFC7591 , Token Issuing (minimum code and client credential flow), authorization and permission handling.

Acceptance Criteria

  1. One working IAM System with the Adoption Shell

  2. Documentation of proper configuration of both Adoption Shell and chosen IAM system

  3. “All in one” package, ready for installation

⏩ IDM.AA.00017 OpenID Provider Configuration Information

SSI OIDC Provider MUST offer an OpenID Provider Configuration Information endpoint as specified in OIDC.Discovery. All SSI-related scopes and claim types SHOULD be exposed through this endpoint for dynamic discovery and configuration. The SSI OIDC Provider MUST fulfill the requirements of OpenID Provider Publishing Configuration Information profile as in OIDC.Conformance 4.

Acceptance Criteria

  1. Documentation of self-conducted conformance testing of OpenID Provider Publishing Configuration Information profile or an official certification from OpenID Foundation

  2. Documentation how the Well-Known Configuration has to be setup

  3. Demonstrate a working dynamic configuration of a standard IAM OIDC broker with OpenID Provider Configuration Information of SSI OIDC Provider

  4. Explanation in the operations concept how to configure it

⏩ IDM.AA.00018 OpenID Connect Implicit profile

SSI OIDC Provider MUST fulfill all the requirements of Implicit OpenID Provider profile as defined in OIDC.Conformance.

Acceptance Criteria

  1. Documentation of self-conducted conformance testing of Implicit OpenID Provider profile or an official certification from OpenID Foundation

  2. Demonstrate a working integration with a standard IAM brokering OIDC Authorization to SSI OIDC Provider with OpenID Connect Implicit profile configuration.

  3. The documentation must describe what to configure in the demonstration IAM

⏩ IDM.AA.00019 OAuth 2.0 Security Best Current Practice

SSI OIDC Provider SHOULD employ all relevant measures for security of OAuth2.0 framework BCP OAuth2 5.

Acceptance Criteria:

  1. Documentation of applied measures as per BCP OAuth2

⏩ IDM.AA.00020 SSI Login Page

The OIDC Provider MUST contain a customizable Standard Login web page integrated into OIDC Authorization flow and endpoint as per OIDC.Core which shows an QR Code for login using another device hosting Personal Credential Manager as well as a button with the same link being able to open Personal Credential Manager on the same device. The button MUST trigger a registered application or page on the new browser tab, without interruption of the count-down and the status polling process.

The SSI Login Page MUST display a progress bar which counts down a configurable time (e.g., 30 seconds).

The login page MUST poll in the background the configured login state URL with a given request identifier for the configured amount of time.

If the request is successful or timed-out during the waiting time the SSI Login Page MUST redirect the User Agent back to the IAM system redirect_url with appropriate response parameters as per OIDC.Core.

This login page MUST be styleable over CSS or html template system to customize the look and feel at the installation and configuration time. The login page should support internationalization and follow either browser settings or OIDC parameters defined for this purpose. OIDC parameters take precedence. Minimum set of supported languages: English, German, French.

Acceptance Criteria

  1. The login page presents an QR Code and the Button Link with an SSI invitation link/proof request

  2. The login page redirects with an error response after the time-out

  3. The login page polls in the background the login state and redirects to the given URL after a successful login

  4. The login page must deliver with one specific Look & Feel aligned with Gaia-X Portal UX. Information regarding Look & Feel of the Gaia-X Portal UX will be provided by eco.

  5. The login page must support required languages and display according to the browser settings or OIDC authorization request parameters as per precedence definition

  6. The documentation must describe Look & Feel customization options and their configuration

⏩ IDM.AA.00021 QR Code Generation

The QR code contains the content of the SSI invitations/proofs, which MUST be obtained from an external URL with the values for scope and a value for “Namespace”. Scope Values MUST be extracted from the authorize request. The URL request body SHOULD follow the following pattern matching the requirements of IDM.TSA Appendix B GetLoginProofInvitation Policy:

    “Namespace”: “AdministrationLogin”,                     // Client
    “sub”: “did:example:123123123”,                         // Optional reference
    “not\_older\_than”: “2021-04-01T01:23:45.678+00:00”,    // Optional ttl of the required proof
    “max\_age”: 3600                                        // Maximum Authentication Age. Specifies the 
                                                            // allowable elapsed time in seconds since 
                                                            // the last time the End-User was actively
                                                            // authenticated

The response body follows the following pattern:


The link content has to be generated in a QR Code. PresentationID needs be securely stored in the browser session, so that it’s available for the IDM.AA.00022 Login State Background Polling process and not revealed outside of this context as it represents a secure token to get identity data.

Acceptance Criteria

  1. The button and the QR Code contain the link content rendered as QR Code

  2. The QR Code must be readable by a smartphone

  3. The presentation ID is not inside the QR Code or button link

⏩ IDM.AA.00022 Login State Background Polling

During the shown Login page, a background task MUST poll for the state of the current presentationID created in IDM.AA.00021 QR Code Generation. This HTTP request MUST execute in the background a request for the state with the following pattern in the request body to Trust Services API IDM.TSA Appendix GetLoginProofResult Policy:

The response body SHOULD follows the following pattern:

  1. No State: HTTP 204

  2. Done: HTTP 200

    “iss”: “...”,
    “sub”: “...”,
    “claim1”: “...”
    “claimx”: “...”
  1. Error response: HTTP 40x

The content in the response MUST be available in the IAM system after the successful response. This MUST be realized by continuing the standard OIDC flow and forming a valid id_token including the claims from the response.

Unsuccessful response shall be followed with an option to retry the process with IDM.AA.00021 QR Code Generation or to fail the process and redirect back to the IAM with appropriate OIDC failure response.

Acceptance Criteria

  1. Login Token with the contained claims and scopes

  2. Correctly signed token

  3. Redirect to IAM System on Success

  4. Offer Retry or redirect back with failure to IAM System on Error

⏩ IDM.AA.00023 Session handling and scope elevation

SSI OIDC Provider MUST employ configurable session handling allowing multiple authorization requests for the same identity being seamlessly handled without a need to authenticate the user again for a pre-defined time period of session validity. id_token_hint parameter as specified in OIDC.Core SHOULD be supported.

In case additional scopes are required the SSI OIDC Provider MUST conduct a proof request for the additional Verifiable Credentials without a need to build a new connection with an invitation QR Code/Link. The option to create a new Link MUST be available, however.

Session handling related parameters of OIDC.Core, like prompt or max_age shall be respected and translated into appropriate proof requests to assure required functionality.

The proof is realized with the same methods and policies as described in IDM.AA.00021 QR Code Generation and IDM.AA.00022 Login State Background Polling using optional sub and max_age parameters.

Acceptance Criteria:

  1. session handling by consecutive authentication requests with id_token_hint do not impose new authentication and authorization and authenticate the user in a seamless manner

  2. a request for additional proofs is conducted and added to id_token in case the requested scope of authorization is wider than previously

  3. Session duration is configurable at installation / deployment time

4.2.3 SSI IAT Provider

⏩ IDM.AA.00024 Offer SSI Client Registration Auth API

An API as per IDM.AA.00011 SSI Client Registration Auth API MUST be offered to enable initiation and polling for the result of SSI-based issuance of IAT for Dynamic Client Registration.

Acceptance Criteria

  1. SSI Client Registration API is offered and documented

⏩ IDM.AA.00025 Policy based authorization

The SSI IAT Provider MUST integrate with Trust Services to conduct policy authorization checks of the client trying to obtain an Initial Access Token (IAT). IAT MUST not be issued unless the policy evaluation allows for that operation.

The following Policies have to be executed by this authorization flow:

  • IDM.TSA Appendix B GetIatProofInvitation - flow initiation

  • IDM.TSA Appendix B GetIatProofResult Policy - polling for a result

Acceptance Criteria

  1. IAT is issued only after successful evaluation of the Policy by Trust Services

  2. negative evaluation of the Policy by Trust Services results in no IAT issued and an appropriate error response

⏩ IDM.AA.00026 Standard IAM Compatibility

The issued Initial Access Token MUST be compatible with the Client Registration Endpoint of the docked standard IAM. It MUST be possible to register with this IAT client as defined in RFC7591.

Acceptance Criteria

  1. A dynamic client with an IAT can be registered in the IAM system over the client registration endpoint.

⏩ IDM.AA.00027 Client Registration

The IAT Provider MUST be registered as an OAuth2 RFC6750 6 Client using client credential grant within the Standard IAM to obtain Initial Access Tokens of the System.

Acceptance Criteria

4.3 Other Nonfunctional Requirements

⏩ IDM.AA.00028 Security Hardening

The whole adoption shell is security relevant, and it has to be defined in the security concept how these components can be more secured and what kind of steps to do.

4.3.1 HTTP Requirements

⏩ IDM.AA.00029 HTTPS

All HTTP Endpoints MUST be protected by TLS 1.3 (2018) (all protocol version numbers SHOULD be superseded by upcoming standards) Each endpoint of the product MUST support TLS certificates which are configurable by the administrator of the system. ⏪

⏩ IDM.AA.00030 HTTP Protocol Definitions

All HTTP Endpoints MUST follow RFC7231 7and RFC5789 8, but it MAY be chosen what of the protocols is necessary to realize the functionality. For problem reports the RFC78079 MUST be used in combination with Standard HTTP Error Codes.⏪

4.3.2 Configuration

⏩ IDM.AA.00031 Configuration

Refer to the 12Factors approach 10. All components MUST support one of the major configuration formats (yaml, json, ini, environment variables) wherever configuration is required. If environment variables are overwriting an actively set configuration, a warning SHOULD be logged. ⏪

4.3.3 Logging Requirements

⏩ IDM.AA.00032 Data Minimization

From GDPR perspective the product MUST NOT log data which is related to personal information. (e.g., User Names, Birth Dates etc. ) The product MUST only log data, which is relevant to technical operations, except for the purpose that, in the event of an incident, enable reconstruction of the sequence of the message exchange for establishing the place and the nature of the incident. The data shall be stored for a period of time in accordance with national requirements and, as a minimum, shall consist of the following elements:

\(a\) node’s identification

\(b\) message identification

\(c\) message data and time

All logged data/information MUST be documented in the GDPR design decisions for a GDPR review.

⏩ IDM.AA.00033 Logging Frameworks

The product MUST use standard RFC5224 11log format and MUST use standard outputs.

4.3.4 Monitoring Requirements

⏩ IDM.AA.00034 Monitoring Frameworks

The product MUST be compliant with OpenTelemetry tooling [^12]. ⏪ [^12] : <(> ⏩ IDM.AA.00035 Alerting Frameworks

Additional to the Monitoring Frameworks an Alerting framework (e.g., Prometheus or Cloud Based) MUST/MAY be in place at least in the System nodes to promptly communicate to e.g., System Administrators or owners the occurrence of an event in form of a security incident or application/system malfunction or anomaly. ⏪

4.3.5 Performance Requirements

⏩ IDM.AA.00036 Performance Scalability

The performance of the product MUST be scalable. This MUST be demonstrated in a load demonstration example. The optimal scalability SHOULD be in the best case a linear behavior of minimum 50% more performance by each additional instance. ⏪

⏩ IDM.AA.00037 Performance by Design

The product SHOULD be designed and implemented in a way, that the implementation is non-blocking and performance oriented. It SHOULD be a microservice architecture, but it MAY follow other concepts. The decision MUST be documented. ⏪

4.3.6 Safety Requirements

⏩ IDM.AA.00038 Recovery Point Objective (RPO)

The RPO for the product MUST be 0 for a single and multiple instance(s). It MAY be higher by configuration or deployment, decided by the user. ⏪

⏩ IDM.AA.00039 Recovery Time Objective (RTO)

The RTO for the product MUST be one Minute for a single instance. For multiple instances the RTO MUST be 0. ⏪

⏩ IDM.AA.00040 Mitigation of Single Point of Failure threats

Critical components in the Gaia-X Ecosystem MUST be identified and strategies to warranty their availability and scalability MUST be implemented. ⏪

4.3.7 Security Requirements General Security Requirements

Each Gaia-X Federation Service SHALL meet the requirements stated in the document “Specification of non-functional Requirements Security and Privacy by Design”. Federation Services specific requirements will be documented in the next chapter. Service Specific Security Requirements

This chapter will describe the service specific requirements, which will extend the requirements defined in the chapter above.

⏩ IDM.AA.00041 Cryptographic Algorithms and Cipher Suites

Cryptographic algorithms and TLS cipher suites SHALL be chosen based on the recommendation from The European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA). These recommendations and the recommendations of other institutions and standardization organization are quite similar CryptoLen[^13]. The recommendations can be found in the technical guidelines TR 02102-112 and TR 02102-213 or SOG-IS Agreed Cryptographic Mechanisms SOG-IS[^16]. ⏪ [^13] : Damien Giry, Prof. Jean-Jacques Quisquater (2020), Cryptographic Key Length Recommendation. <(>

⏩ IDM.AA.00042 Digital Certificates

For digital certificates and cryptographic signatures in the context, the major requirements on cryptographic algorithms and key length MUST meet the definitions in the following table (as of 2020):

Signature Algorithm

Key size

Hash function

EC-DSA Min. 250 Bit SHA-2 with an output length ≥ 256 Bit or better

RSA-PSS (recommended)

RSA-PKCS#1 v1.5 (legacy)

Min. 3000 Bit RSA Modulus (n) with a public exponent e > 2^16 SHA-2 with an output length ≥ 256 Bit or better

Min. 3000 Bit prime p

250 Bit key q

SHA-2 with an output length ≥ 256 Bit or better

Table 3: Requirements on cryptographic algorithms and key length

Named curves SHALL be used for EC-DSA (e.g., NIST-p-256). ⏪

⏩ IDM.AA.00043 TLS Certificate Validity Periods

In general, the recommended validity period for a certificate used in the system should be one year or less. Under some circumstances (for example RootCA) the certificate validity can be extended. Certificate owners MUST ensure that valid certificates are renewed and replaced before their expiration to prevent service outages.⏪

⏩ IDM.AA.00044 Security by Design

The software security MUST be from the beginning a design principle. Means separation of concerns, different administrative roles, especially for private key material and separate access to the data MUST be covered from the first second. It MUST be described in the security concept, what are the different security risks of the product and how they are mitigated (e.g., by Threat Modeling Protocols) ⏪

⏩ IDM.AA.00045 Installation of Critical Security Updates

Node operators SHALL deploy security critical updates without undue delay. ⏪

⏩ IDM.AA.00046 Avoid HTTP Request Smuggling

To avoid Request Smuggling attacks, the product MUST implement a standard which handles this kind of attack by design, because the attack vector results in an insufficient implementation of the header handling. The chosen way to handle it MUST be shared to the other implementers of all other subcomponents within IDM & Trust and MUST be described in the security concept. ⏪

⏩ IDM.AA.00047 HTTP Pentesting

All HTTP parts of the product has to be pen tested, for the following criteria:

  1. Unauthorized Access to the System MUST be tested

  2. Unauthorized Actions MUST be triggered without a user action

  3. Endpoints MUST be tested for HTTP smuggling attack vectors

  4. If a datastore is present over HTTP, illegal data access MUST be tested

It’s RECOMMENDED to test more attack vectors and document it for the purpose to mitigate it in later versions. ⏪

⏩ IDM.AA.00048 Storage of Secrets

The storage of secret information such as private keys MUST take place in state-of-the-art secure environments to protect secret data confidentiality and integrity. Examples of this are Secure Enclaves, TPMs, HSM or Secure Vaults. In case (Personal) Agents are not equipped with a secure storage it MAY also be possible to store the secrets in a third party (e.g., Cloud) provider (e.g., Secure Wallet) that MUST provide overall the same level of security as the aforementioned methods. ⏪

⏩ IDM.AA.00049 Secret Distribution and Usage

The product MUST ensure interoperability of cryptographic primitives and components by public standards and MUST use secure state of the art methods to create and import secrets into the secure storage, as well as performing cryptographic operations (e.g., encryption or digital signatures). For Key distribution, state of the art DKMS methods MUST be implemented. ⏪

⏩ IDM.AA.00050 Support for Potential Requirements for Secret Storages

Devices that hold cryptographic information and perform cryptographic functions MUST be compliant with the standard PKCS #11. Moreover, the products MUST be potentially eligible for a FIPS-140-214 or ETSI/Common Criteria certification with the minimum-security level necessary to operate securely in the Gaia-X ecosystem. Security Levels in FIPS-140-2 range from 1 to 4. Current HSM Cloud Service offerings (AWS, Azure, GCP) are Level 3. ⏪

All timestamps MUST be issued according to RFC316115. ⏪

Secret Storage components play a central role in storage, encryption, and digital signing in the Gaia-X ecosystem, thus they can become a single point of failure for a Gaia-X participant, for example an organization. Therefore, methods and procedures to ensure the availability and scalability of the Secret Storage functionality MUST be implemented. ⏪

4.3.8 3.3.8. Software Quality Attributes

⏩ IDM.AA.00053 Quality Aspects

The software MUST meet the following requirements:

  • The quality standards MUST meet ISO 25010 ISO2500016

  • Robustness / Reliability

  • Performance

  • Availability must be 24/7

  • Interoperability with the other work packages

  • Security

  • Adaptability / expandability

  • Maintainability and Code Quality

  • Scalability

Major security concerns regarding design and implementation MUST be documented and highlighted to the steering board. Minor security concerns SHALL be documented and mitigated. ⏪

4.3.9 Business Rules

Business Rules are defined by external components, especially by IDM.TSA.

4.4 Compliance

⏩ IDM.AA.00054 GDPR Audit Logging

All GDPR relevant access to personal relevant data MUST be logged for a later audit. ⏪

⏩ IDM.AA.00055 GDPR Data Processing

Is it necessary to process person-relevant data, it MUST be earmarked to a clearly defined business process, which has to be described in the GDPR design decisions. All person relevant data MUST be deleted after the processing, if applicable. ⏪

4.5 Design and Implementation

Please also refer to [TDR] for further requirements.

4.5.1 Installation

⏩ IDM.AA.00056 Micro Service Architecture

For a better scale out and decentralization, the product architecture MUST a micro service architecture.⏪

⏩ IDM.AA.00057 Independent Service

All Adoption Shell functions MUST be separately deployable web applications, which communicate with other systems either over exposed HTTP-based APIs or consume HTTP-based APIs. The components MUST NOT be built into any particular IAM system in a way of extension or plugin, so that it’s always possible to connect them to any IAM system which is offering the needed APIs.

Acceptance Criteria

  1. All functions of the Adoption Shell are deployable as standalone web applications ⏪

4.5.2 Distribution

⏩ IDM.AA.00058 Config Data Distribution

The product SHOULD support a global data distribution of config data to synchronize configurations between multiple regions in the world. Built-in synchronization technology (asynchronous and synchronous) MAY be used. ⏪

4.5.3 Maintainability

⏩ IDM.AA.00059 Micro Service Architecture

For a better scale out, maintainability and decentralization, the product architecture MUST have a micro service architecture. Each microservice MUST NOT be limited on the lines of code or number of days to implement it. The service “size” SHOULD be oriented on the fine granular business capabilities. (e.g., Order, ListMenu, Payment). ⏪

⏩ IDM.AA.00060 Domain Driven Design

To support the micro service architecture within the maintainability, it MUST be declared a domain model before realization. The software description MUST explain which domain model was chosen, which services contain it and how it scales. This MUST be documented in the public code repository to support future enhancements for new developers. ⏪

4.5.4 Operability

⏩ IDM.AA.00061 FTE Estimation

The product MUST be designed so that over scripts and tools one FTE within a Month SHOULD host and operate the product without any third-party help. It MUST be sketched in the operations concept how this can be achieved. If this target is not reachable it MAY be explained and described why the effort is higher and appropriate. ⏪

4.5.5 Interoperability

⏩ IDM.AA.00062 Interoperability of IT security features and algorithms

The following interoperability requirements of the respective IT security features and algorithms MUST be ensured across the system components:

  • Interoperability of crypto algorithms and protocols (including the novel peer-reviewed ones through the established bodies and communities)

  • Interoperability of secure secret transfer protocols (such as the holistic usage of PKCS#11 for HSM communication, etc.)

  • Format interoperability of crypto material (such as the holistic usage of PKCS#12 for relevant cases) ⏪

  1. N. Sakimura, J. Bradley, M. Jones, E. Jay. (2014), OpenID Connect Discovery 1.0 incorporating errata set 1.<(> 

  2. Gaia-X Trust Framework. (2022). 

  3. Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) (2015). OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration Protocol.<(OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration Protocol)> 

  4. OpenID Connect Working Group, OpenID Foundation (2018), OpenID Connect Conformance Profiles v3.0. <(> 

  5. T. Lodderstedt, J. Bradley, A. Labunets, D. Fett (2020), OAuth 2.0 Security Best Current Practice draft-ietf-oauth-security-topics-16. <(> ⏪ 

  6. Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) (2012), The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework: Bearer Token Usage. <()> 1. A dynamic client with a software statement can be registered in the IAM system over the client registration endpoint. 

  7. Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) (2014), Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Semantics and Content. <(> 

  8. Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) (2010), PATCH Method for HTTP. <(> 

  9. Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) (2016), Problem Details for HTTP APIs. <(> 

  10. The Twelve-Factor App (2010). <(> 

  11. R. Gerhards (2009). The Syslog Protocol. <(> 

  12. BSI (2022), Cryptographic Mechanisms: Recommendations and Key Lengths BSI TR-02102-. <(> 

  13. BSI (2022), Cryptographic Mechanisms: Recommendations and Key Lengths: Use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) BSI TR-02102-2. <(> [^16]SOG-IS Crypto Working Group (2020), SOG-IS Crypto Evaluation Scheme - Agreed Cryptographic Mechanisms. <(> 

  14. NIST (2001) FIPS 140–2, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules .<(> ⏩ IDM.AA.00051 Secure Timestamps 

  15. C. Adams, P. Cain, D. Pinkas, R. Zuccherato (2001), Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure, Time-Stamp Protocol (TSP). <(> ⏩ IDM.AA.00052 Special Availability and Scalability Requirements for Secret Storage Components 

  16. ISO 25000 Portal (n.d.), ISO/IEC 25010;<(>.